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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Cecil the Lion was killed in Zimbabwe by a dentist 
from Minnesota, Walter Palmer, social media exploded with disgust 
and horror.1  Cecil the Lion achieved an iconic status.  In part, the 
                                                                                                               
* Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; SJD, Harvard Law 
School; LLB (Hons), The London School of Economics.  This article is based on and 
expanded from a presentation at the Asian Law Review Symposium, “Combating 
International Wildlife Crime: Enforcement, Implementation and Legal Issues” held at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School on February 12, 2016.  I am grateful to the 
organizers of the symposium and the editors of the Asian Law Review for organizing such 
an engaging event. 
 1 Jani Actman, Cecil the Lion Died One Year Ago—Here’s What’s Happened Since, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 30, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/06/cecil-
african-lion-anniversary-death-trophy-hunting-zimbabwe/, archived at https://perma.cc/
NL8B-HKPH; Christina Capecchi & Katie Rogers, Killer of Cecil the Lion Finds Out That 
He Is a Target Now, of Internet Vigilantism, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/us/cecil-the-lion-walter-palmer.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/D5RJ-QM7Q.  For a fuller account of the public outcry, see Myanna Dellinger, 
Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable for Reasons of Public Policy, 41 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 395, 400–03 (2016) (explaining that the public attention and reactions regarding 
trophy hunting took place at an unprecedented level). 
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protests were driven by shock at the killing of a beautiful and 
symbolic animal who was the subject of serious research.2  Among 
the social media storm, though, there was also an underlying current: 
how could the killing of this magnificent animal, which many people 
understood to be endangered, be legal? 
Although initial reports suggested aspects of the hunt were 
illegal, Zimbabwe’s subsequent actions suggest that the hunt was 
legal or mostly legal under Zimbabwe law.3  And the protests and 
challenges did not go unanswered.  Supporters of hunting and some 
conservationists pointed out that trophy hunting is legal in many 
countries, that it provides support for local communities who would 
otherwise find no value in their wildlife, and that it should be 
considered an important tool in our conservation toolbox.4  Although 
some of these commentators might acknowledge that the killing of 
Cecil the Lion did not fit the ideal model, many believe that protests 
of his death were a reaction driven by excess emotion or hypocrisy, 
rather than rational conservation thinking or concern for the people 
of Zimbabwe.5 
This fierce debate about the role of trophy hunting in 
conserving endangered species echoes debates in endangered species 
conservation generally.  Despite differences in the form of legal trade, 
these debates all center on the appropriate role of allowing legal trade 
in those species, whether by trophy hunting or other means.  At stake 
                                                                                                               
 2 Cecil was being tracked by a conservation group in the United Kingdom, Oxford’s 
Wildlife Conservation Research Unit (“Wildcru”).  Actman, supra note 1. 
 3 Norimitsu Onishi, Zimbabwe Won’t Charge Dentist Who Killed Cecil the Lion, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/africa/zimbabwe-will-
not-charge-dentist-who-killed-cecil-the-lion.html, archived at https://perma.cc/C9KH-
5FLB. 
 4 Norimitsu Onishi, Outcry for Cecil the Lion Could Undercut Conservation Efforts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/world/africa/outcry-for-
cecil-the-lion-could-undercut-conservation-efforts.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
8YGV-9FMW. 
 5 Id. (discussing the reaction of conservationists against the public condemnation 
toward Cecil’s death); Goodwell Nzou, Opinion, In Zimbabwe, We Don’t Cry for Lions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/opinion/in-zimbabwe-we-dont-
cry-for-lions.html, archived at https://perma.cc/Z9PC-PNVT (“The American tendency to 
romanticize animals that have been given actual names and to jump onto a hashtag train has 
turned an ordinary situation . . . into what seems to my Zimbabwean eyes an absurdist 
circus.”).  See also Wadzanai Mhute, Readers on Cecil the Lion, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE 
(Aug. 7, 2015, 11:26 AM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/readers-on-
cecil-the-lion/, archived at https://perma.cc/3C8P-YZV5 (detailing the contradictory 
reactions to Cecil’s death). 
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are survival of species, the interests of communities of people living 
with the species, big money, and cultural sensitivities. 
Perhaps surprisingly to many people, some of the most 
endangered species, threatened by international trade because they or 
their parts are prized by consumers, are both subject to bans on 
international trade and subject to exceptions to those bans.  What 
effect do these incomplete bans have on the markets for these species 
and the species’ chances of survival?  These incomplete bans and 
their relationship to the uncertainty of markets for endangered species 
are the subject of this article. 
All sides can acknowledge the tragic loss of a magnificent 
patriarchal African lion, without endorsing any retaliation or violence 
against Mr. Palmer.  Yet beyond that, the sides quickly move to 
opposite ends of the spectrum.  Nevertheless, the true lesson from the 
death of Cecil the Lion is more complex and demonstrates that the 
arguments need to be carefully weighed, always in context.  
Thousands of wild fauna and flora are traded perfectly legally around 
the world, with no apparent threat to their long-term survival.  
However, for some species, demand from international trade is 
driving poaching and leading to critically endangered populations.  
For these most endangered species threatened by trade, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
serves as the mechanism to regulate and potentially end that trade.6  
Yet, for many of those most endangered species, CITES creates a 
type of dual system referred to in this article as an incomplete ban. 
This article examines the arguments surrounding trade in 
these species and demonstrates that the incomplete bans discussed 
here exacerbate uncertainties in markets for endangered species.  
With the level of uncertainty that arises, and the perverse incentives 
created by incomplete bans, policy-makers should be highly skeptical 
of positions that would allow legal trade of the most in-demand and 
endangered species.  In practice, these incomplete trade bans 
exacerbate complexity and can actually fuel illegal trade to the 
ultimate detriment of the species. 
This article does not address animal rights or ethical 
perspectives that would advocate against hunting or any killing of 
                                                                                                               
 6 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 [hereinafter CITES], https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/
eng/disc/CITES-Convention-EN.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/3CUM-P6QY. 
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wild animals.7  These perspectives are important, and particularly 
relevant for some of the species under discussion, such as the African 
elephant, because of what we know about their relationships, 
intelligence, and emotional life.  However, the article attempts to 
engage the arguments of proponents of legal trade on their own terms, 
assessing their own arguments, and leaves to one side counter-
arguments that come at the problem with a different set of values. 
II. THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
ENDANGERED SPECIES (CITES) 
CITES, concluded in 1973, is one of the most significant 
international conservation treaties, with 183 parties as of September, 
2016.  Yet it has limited scope and application.  It applies only to 
species whose survival is threatened by being the subject of 
international trade and regulates that international trade.8  It does 
nothing to address threats stemming from habitat loss or other issues.  
CITES relies on an appendix system, with listing done by the parties 
to the Convention at their regularly held Conferences of the Parties 
according to criteria agreed to by the parties.9 
Appendix I is for the most endangered species, “all species 
threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade.”10  
Species listed on Appendix I will be subject to both export and import 
permits, both of which require state agencies to make “non-detriment 
findings” (NDFs) before allowing export and import.11  NDFs are a 
critical part of the process of CITES.  States have significant capacity 
problems in determining when trade will be subject to NDFs, which 
the parties and Secretariat to CITES have begun to try to address in 
recent years.12   Nevertheless, these NDFs are key to whether CITES 
                                                                                                               
 7 See Dellinger, supra note 1, at 402 (discussing ethical objections to Cecil’s killing). 
 8 CITES, supra note 6, art. II. 
 9 Criteria for Amendment of Appendices I and II, Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16), 
CITES Conference of the Parties, Nov. 18, 1994, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/
eng/res/09/E-Res-09-24R16.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/F859-A97A [hereinafter 
Criteria for Listing]. 
 10 CITES, supra note 6, art. II(1). 
 11 CITES, supra note 6, arts. III(2)(a), III(3)(a). 
 12 See Non-Detriment Findings, Resolution Conf. 16.7, CITIES Conference of the 
Parties, Mar. 14, 2013, https://www.cites.org/eng/res/16/16-07.php, archived at 
https://perma.cc/59JT-MDD9 (“RECOGNIZING that, in accordance with Article III and IV 
of the Convention, export permits for specimens of species included in Appendices I and II 
shall be granted only when a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss1/5
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can successfully regulate trade in species so that they do not go 
extinct.13 
In addition to the requirement for NDFs, the import permit 
requires that that “specimen is not to be used for primarily 
commercial purposes.”14 As a result of the import permit requirement 
that international trade not be for “primarily commercial purposes,” 
Appendix I results in an apparent complete ban on international trade 
in that species and parts of that species.15  There are around 630 
species of fauna listed on Appendix I, including 300 mammals.16  
There are around 300 plants listed on Appendix I.17 
Appendix II applies to all species “which although not 
necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless 
trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in 
order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival.”18  The 
language is intended to catch species that are not currently at risk of 
imminent extinction, but that are sufficiently traded across 
international borders that such trade could rise to a level incompatible 
with their survival.  Appendix II also provides for so-called lookalike 
species to be added to the list, so that trade in those lookalike species 
                                                                                                               
export will not be detrimental to the survival of the species . . . ); ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE CITES TREATY AND COMPLIANCE 
152–54 (2002) (explaining the process in which several parties had not designated Scientific 
Authorities, which likely has “long undermined the implementation of CITES”); Soledad 
Aguilar, Regulatory Tools for the Management of Fish and Timber Species Through CITES, 
22 RECIEL 281, 283 (2013) (describing capacity problems for developing NDFs); Annecoos 
Wiersema, Uncertainty, Precaution, and Adaptive Management in Wildlife Trade, 36 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 375, 403–07 (2015) (stating that in spite of difficulties in effecting compliance 
with non-detriment finding requirements, recent measures such as the Resolution Conf. 16.7 
on Non-Detriment Findings have tried to improve the capacity of state parties). 
 13 Aguilar, supra note 12, at 283. 
 14 CITES, supra note 6, art. III(3)(c). 
 15 “Primarily commercial purposes” has been defined broadly by the parties.  See 
Definition of “Primarily Commercial Purposes”, Resolution Conf. 5.10 (Rev. CoP15), 
CITIES Conference of the Parties, May 3, 1985, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/
res/all/05/E05-10R15.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4MZ5-HVQN (stating the principles 
and examples for assessing whether species in certain transactions are used for primarily 
commercial purposes).  The treaty exempts non-commercial scientific exchange from these 
provisions, species acquired prior to the treaty’s application to that species, and animals or 
plants bred in captivity.  This latter exception is discussed in the text below.  See CITES, 
supra note 6, art. VII (discussing exemptions for certain specimens related to trade). 
 16 The CITES Species, CITES, https://cites.org/eng/disc/species.php (last visited Oct. 
12, 2016).  These numbers are valid before the Seventeenth CoP, held in September, 2016. 
 17 Id. 
 18 CITES, supra note 6, art. II(2)(a). 
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does not undermine efforts to protect species needing strict 
regulation.19 
Once species are listed on Appendix II, they can only be 
traded internationally if the state has issued an export permit.20  For 
these export permits, the state must again have made NDFs. 21  
However, no import permit is required.  As a result, there is no 
automatic limit on trade for commercial purposes for Appendix II 
species and they can be legally traded internationally provided they 
are accompanied by an export permit.  Around 4,800 species of fauna 
are listed on CITES Appendix II, including around 500 mammals.22  
Around 25,500 plants are listed on CITES Appendix II.23  Appendix 
II, therefore, has over seven times as many species of fauna as are 
listed on Appendix I, and around eighty-five times as many species 
of plants as are listed on Appendix I. 
The quantitative difference between listings on Appendix II 
and Appendix I is significant because it demonstrates CITES is not a 
trade ban treaty, but rather a treaty that is set up to regulate trade in 
species threatened by international trade.  The vast majority of the 
species listed on Appendix II are traded without major uproar or 
social media attention.  These species are not the most highly 
endangered, or are not primarily threatened by trade, according to 
current data at least. 24   Nevertheless, between Appendix I and 
Appendix II, there is a middle ground that has emerged in the practice 
of the parties to CITES that can cover some of the most iconic and 
critically endangered species, and result in incomplete bans in 
international trade in them and their parts. 
Listing occurs by agreement of the parties and by vote at the 
CoPs, held every three years. 25   In substantive terms, listing is 
governed by criteria that have been developed by the parties. 26  
Listing or movement of a species between Appendices I and II 
                                                                                                               
 19 CITES, supra note 6, art. II(2)(b). 
 20 CITES, supra note 6, art. IV(2). 
 21 CITES, supra note 6, art. III(2)(a). 
 22 The CITES Species, supra note 16. 
 23 The CITES Species, supra note 16. 
 24 Listing debates can still be highly contentious.  For discussion of recent listing 
debates about sharks and polar bears, see Wiersema, supra note 12, at 408–15 (discussing 
the listing debates concerning shark and polar bears populations). 
 25 CITES, supra note 6, art. XI. 
 26 Criteria for Listing, supra note 9. 
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requires a two-thirds majority of the parties present and voting.27  If 
the threshold for listing is reached, species will be listed and all 
parties are bound unless they enter a reservation.28  Parties may enter 
reservations within ninety days of a listing decision, and they will 
then be treated as a non-party for purposes of that species.29  CITES 
requires the same paperwork or its equivalent when parties trade with 
non-parties as when parties trade with parties.30  Thus, if a state wants 
to be truly free of regulation of a listed species, it will need to find a 
trading party that is also willing to enter a reservation for that species. 
CITES has one additional Appendix, Appendix III, which 
operates differently. 31   Appendix III listing does not require 
agreement by all the parties to CITES, but allows an individual state 
to identify any species “subject to regulation within its jurisdiction 
for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as 
needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of trade.”32  
Once a species is listed on Appendix III, export from that state will 
require an export permit, although no NDFs are required. 33  
Importing countries must then monitor the source of that species and 
require an export permit if the species originated from the listing 
state.34  The export permit must only be issued if the specimen has 
not been obtained contrary to the laws of the listing state.35 
Thus, although listing on Appendix III does not result in the 
requirement of an NDF, the Appendix allows parties to use the 
mechanisms of CITES to control trade of a particular species even if 
that species has not been listed on either Appendix II or Appendix I.  
The Appendix also allows parties to ensure that any domestic 
provisions they have in place for protection can be incorporated into 
the CITES permitting process.  In this sense, Appendix III listing 
allows for parties to CITES to impose greater regulatory burdens on 
trade in a particular species than the parties have agreed to. 
                                                                                                               
 27 CITES, supra note 6, art. XV(1). 
 28 CITES, supra note 6, art. XV(1). 
 29 CITES, supra note 6, art. XV(3). 
 30 CITES, supra note 6, art. X. 
 31 See CITES, supra note 6, arts. II(3), V (focusing on the differences applied for 
species under Appendix III). 
 32 CITES, supra note 6, art. II(3). 
 33 CITES, supra note 6, art. V(2). 
 34 CITES, supra note 6, art. V(3). 
 35 CITES, supra note 6, art. V(2)(a). 
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III. INCOMPLETE BANS 
Incomplete bans are a subset of a dual stream market.  When 
trade in a species is made subject to regulation, it is subject to a dual 
stream market because it can now be traded legally and illegally.  
Thus, Appendix II and Appendix III listing create dual stream 
markets because listing on either brings with it some regulation of 
international trade in that species.  The regulation may appear to be a 
formality, with a requirement for a document—an export permit in 
the case of an Appendix II- or Appendix III-listed species.  Even so, 
regulating legal trade creates a category of possible non-compliant 
trade—illegal trade.  Appendix I listing banning commercial trade 
does not usually create a dual stream market, except to the extent that 
exceptions for scientific exchange could be seen as a legal form of 
trade. 
Dual stream markets can operate for many species regulated 
by CITES with no need to resort to an Appendix I listing and its 
accompanying ban on commercial trade.  Indeed, some of the most 
interesting developments at the last few CoPs involve the listing on 
Appendix II of species of timber and fish that are part of a robust 
commercial trade so that the parties can better manage that trade.36  
Nevertheless, the regulation of dual stream markets requires capacity 
and resources to ensure that illegal sources are limited and do not 
serve to undermine legal trade.  These investments are appropriate 
and necessary given that there is no serious suggestion that all legal 
international trade in species of wild animals and plants be stopped. 
Yet, within the general regulatory needs of dual stream 
markets, there is a category of legal trade that raises distinct problems.  
These are the incomplete bans I focus on in this article. What makes 
these types of dual stream market distinct is that the species is first 
treated as warranting a ban on trade.  The starting presumption is that 
trade must be banned or severely curtailed because of the degree of 
threat to the species’ survival from international trade.  This can 
happen either by listing on Appendix I or by listing on Appendix II 
with added restrictions on trade, as we shall see.  Then, one or more 
narrow exceptions are added, generally by splitting the species or 
distinguishing captive-bred populations. 
                                                                                                               
 36 Sara F. Oldfield, The Evolving Role of CITES in Regulating the International Timber 
Trade, 22 RECIEL 291 (2013); Aguilar, supra note 12 (discussing fish and timber species). 
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The use of the word “ban” is important here, because it 
demonstrates that these species are subject to some kind of trade ban, 
but that the ban is incomplete because there are exceptions.  These 
exceptions are distinct from exceptions allowing non-commercial 
exchange for scientific research because they explicitly allow for 
commercially-related trade, and are, therefore, direct exceptions to 
limitations on commercial international trade.  Thus, these are not 
species that are simply the subject of regulatory control through the 
export permit process envisioned in Appendix II.  When the 
exceptions to CITES are relied on, the trade in question is completely 
legal under CITES.37 
These species are often most at risk because they are iconic: 
elephants, rhinoceros, lions, and tigers.  Their parts are also in high 
demand and, in some sense, also iconic: ivory, rhino horn, lion 
trophies and lion bones, and tiger pelts and bones.  Others of these 
species are less iconic but have parts that are in high demand, such as 
pangolin species.  The price for rhino horn has recently been 
estimated at $60,000 per pound, higher than the price for gold, 
diamonds or cocaine.38  The market price for pangolin scales has risen 
from $300 to $600 per kilogram in the last eight years in China’s 
Yunnan Province and ten-fold in the last five years in Nigeria, 
according to a proposal for transfer of African pangolin species to 
Appendix I.39 
What characterizes these species is a level of demand that is 
unsustainable for the populations of the species.  Demand may come 
from centuries-old traditional uses, but can also stem from newly 
advertised uses.  In addition, demand for wild species is often the 
product of increasing wealth, either because more people can afford 
traditionally highly-prized parts or because it can become a form of 
                                                                                                               
 37 CITES, supra note 6, art. VII.  
 38 Jennifer Harper, $60K a Pound: Illegal Rhino Horn Now Declared More Valuable 
than Gold, Diamonds and Cocaine, WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2015), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2015/may/17/rhino-horn-considered-cure-all-and-aphrodesiac-now/, 
archived at https://perma.cc/BZX4-FTVV. 
 39 See Seventeenth Meeting of the CITIES Conference of the Parties, Consideration of 
Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP17 Prop. 12, at 2 (Sept. 24–Oct. 5, 
2016), https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/E-CoP17-Prop-12.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/L8BQ-W9QP [hereinafter Prop. 12] (proposing the transfer of 
four species—Manis tetradactyla, M. tricuspis, M. gigantea, and M. temminckii—from 
CITES Appendix II to Appendix I). 
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conspicuous consumption, as is the case with rhino horn.40  The level 
of demand for these species’ parts adds an important dimension to 
questions about the role of trade in their conservation. 
The clearest form of incomplete ban is when a species is listed 
on Appendix I, showing that the parties have considered the threat 
from trade to warrant a complete ban on commercial trade.  Yet, some 
species listed on Appendix I may still be the subject of international 
trade.  The structure of CITES is significant here. 
CITES is structured to assume that a ban is appropriate for the 
most threatened species.  Although some proponents of allowing 
more trade have challenged the validity of this assumption, it is an 
assumption embedded within CITES’ text.41  That structure of CITES 
means that when a species is listed on Appendix I, a nod is being 
made to the underlying assumption that trade is bad.  But when an 
exception is made, such as split-listing or a captive-breeding program, 
a nod is also being made to a view that trade can be good for species.  
That’s because these are the species that are most at risk—indeed, 
trade has already been determined to be a threat—yet the argument is 
that having a market will help them.42 
                                                                                                               
 40 TOM MILLIKEN & JO SHAW, TRAFFIC, THE SOUTH AFRICA—VIET NAM RHINO HORN 
TRADE NEXUS 134–36 (2012), http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_mam
mals66.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/A2EH-6AF8. 
 41 See, e.g., Chris Huxley, CITES: The Vision, in ENDANGERED SPECIES, THREATENED 
CONVENTION: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CITES, THE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 3, 10–11 (Jon 
Hutton & Barnabas Dickson eds. 2000) [hereinafter ENDANGERED SPECIES, THREATENED 
CONVENTION] (stating that the main goal of CITES is to protect endangered species by setting 
up a consistent law and enforcing the restrictions on both imports and exports); R.B. Martin, 
When CITES Works and When It Does Not, in ENDANGERED SPECIES, THREATENED 
CONVENTION, supra, at 29, 36 (claiming that changes such as “a quota system” after 
replacing “the existing system of two appendices” with “a single appendix” of a listing of 
“all species of international concern” would make possible a “trade ban on any species.”). 
 42 The most commonly cited examples where trade appears to have benefited a species 
are the Nile Crocodile and the Vicuña.  See Jon Hutton & Grahame Webb, Crocodiles: Legal 
Trade Snaps Back, in TRADE IN WILDLIFE: REGULATION FOR CONSERVATION 108, 108–18 
(Sara Oldfield ed., 2003) (alteration in original) (claiming that “legal trade can displace 
illegal trade” rather than “legal trade [leading] to illegal trade”); Ryan R.J. McAllister et al., 
Legalizing Markets and the Consequences for Poaching of Wildlife Species: The Vicuña as 
a Case Study, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 120 (2009) (explaining that the creation of an international 
market for vicuña can paradoxically assure the species’ sustainable population); Henriette 
Kievit, Conservation the Nile Crocodile: Has CITES Helped or Hindered?, in ENDANGERED 
SPECIES, THREATENED CONVENTION, supra note 41, at 88, 93 (arguing that the Nile Crocodile 
has thrived because of its value as an economic asset for sale of its parts rather than because 
of CITES).  Cf. John Thorbjarnarson, Crocodile Tears and Skins: International Trade, 
Economic Constraints and Limits to the Sustainable Use of Crocodilians, 13 CONSERVATION 
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This can take a few forms.  Some species are listed on 
Appendix I, but have sub-populations listed on Appendix II.  For 
example, the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) is listed on 
Appendix I, but populations of the same species in Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are listed on Appendix II.43  
These populations are in turn subject to zero export quotas, with 
provision for periodic sales between designated countries.44  This 
split listing and unique treatment of the African elephant is the result 
of longstanding and bitter disputes about the best way to manage 
poaching and demand for ivory, and differences in elephant 
population numbers in different regions of Africa.  To date, since the 
split listing, there have been two sales of ivory between designated 
countries, one to Japan in 1999 and one to Japanese and Chinese 
accredited traders in 2008.45 
Similarly, the White rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum) is 
listed on Appendix I, with populations of the sub-species 
Ceratotherium simum simum in South Africa and Swaziland listed on 
Appendix II. 46   This split listing of certain species embodies an 
incomplete ban, because the split in listing is based on geographical 
boundaries, not on the particular part or specimen of the species in 
demand.  Ivory and rhino horn from southern African states are not 
different for purposes of their use or consumption; the differences lie 
in the politics and conditions of the range states. 
For some species listed on Appendix II, the ban on 
international trade comes from their treatment on that Appendix.  
Some species listed entirely on Appendix II can be considered to be 
subject to an incomplete ban because they are subject to stricter 
requirements than the text of CITES alone would require for 
Appendix II-listed species, the export permit premised on an NDF.  
                                                                                                               
BIOLOGY 465 (1999) (stating that the market for crocodilian skins is cyclical, which makes 
conservation and sustainable habitats vulnerable to fluctuations in price). 
 43 See Checklist of CITES Species, CITES, http://checklist.cites.org/#/en, archived at 
https://perma.cc/CVD8-8TC9 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) (containing the official list of 
CITES-listed species). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Press Release, CITES, Ivory Auctions Raise 15 Million USD for Elephant 
Conservation (Nov. 7, 2008), https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/2008/081107_ivory.shtml, 
archived at https://perma.cc/6BSR-LEU5; Press Release, CITES, CITES Sets Strict 
Conditions for Any Possible Future Ivory Sales (Nov. 12, 2002), https://cites.org/
eng/news/pr/2002/021112_ivory_update.shtml, archived at https://perma.cc/ADN6-B73C. 
 46 See Checklist of CITES Species, supra note 43 (providing information on 
Ceratotherium simum and Ceratotherium simum simum). 
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They may be subject to zero export quotas.  Alternatively, annotations 
may specify that these species can only be traded for certain purposes, 
such as hunting trophies. Hence, they can be said to be subject to an 
incomplete ban—no trade is allowed, except in certain circumstances.  
Although the text of Appendix II does not specifically advocate for 
quotas as a means of managing international trade in these species, 
relying instead on NDFs, quotas have become a useful tool for the 
parties.  These quotas even draw an explicit distinction based on the 
specific consumptive use, as with hunting trophies. 
Split listing provides another example of this form of 
incomplete ban when we focus on the Appendix II-listed populations.  
Where there is split listing, the populations listed on Appendix II can 
also be considered to be subject to an incomplete ban because, despite 
listing on Appendix II, they are subject to stricter requirements than 
the text of CITES alone would require.  The populations of the 
African elephant that are on Appendix II are subject to a zero export 
quota, with provision for periodic sales between designated countries.  
Populations of the sub-species of White rhinoceros listed on 
Appendix II are also subject to limitations on international trade, with 
their inclusion on Appendix II “for the exclusive purpose of allowing 
international trade in live animals to appropriate and acceptable 
destinations and hunting trophies.”47  At the Seventeenth CoP in 2016, 
Swaziland requested an amendment of this annotation to allow it to 
conduct “a limited and regulated trade in white rhino horn which has 
been collected in the past from natural deaths, or recovered from 
poached Swazi rhino, as well as horn to be harvested in a non-lethal 
way from a limited number of white rhino in the future in 
Swaziland.”48 
CITES also provides that captive-bred populations are not 
subject to the same restrictions as wild-caught populations.49  If an 
animal or plant species is included in Appendix I, an individual of 
that species bred for commercial purposes will be treated as if it were 
                                                                                                               
 47 Checklist of CITES Species, supra note 43. 
 48 Seventeenth Meeting of the CITES Conference of the Parties, Consideration of 
Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP17 Prop. 7 (Sept. 24–Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/E-CoP17-Prop-07.pdf, archived 
at https://perma.cc/KLT3-MHGR.  Swaziland had expected South Africa to join its proposal, 
but South Africa decided against it after failing to garner international support for the idea.  
Id.  Although the request failed, the form of the requested notation is illustrative. 
 49 CITES, supra note 6, art. VII(4). 
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listed on Appendix II.50  Thus, even species subject to the strongest 
limits on international trade under Appendix I, or a species subject to 
restrictions under Appendix II, may have populations that are 
captive-bred and permitted to be in international trade. 
Domestic law also interacts with CITES to create incomplete 
bans.  Species listed on Appendix I and subject to a ban on 
international commercial trade can nevertheless be traded in domestic 
markets without implicating CITES.  States may choose to close 
down their domestic markets, but they often do not.  Thus, a species 
and its parts that cannot be traded internationally may still be the 
subject of commercial activity within a country’s borders without any 
violation of law. 
On the other side, domestic law may add restrictions to export 
through specific requirements related to particular consumptive uses, 
such as for trophy hunters, or it may limit imports of specimens even 
where export was permitted by the range state.  In these instances, the 
ban emanates from domestic laws, but the ban does not cover all 
international trade and is therefore incomplete.  Appendix III listing 
can be a way of achieving this dynamic. 
Dual markets require regulatory mechanisms that can identify 
whether a species or specimen is being traded legally.  Legal markets 
can be subject to fraud, and laundering, and a range of illegal tactics.  
Corruption is also a significant problem. 
Incomplete bans raise all these same problems of dual markets, 
but also raise a new set of problems.  Sometimes, they exacerbate the 
problems of dual markets; other times, they create distinct problems 
of their own.  The question is whether the tension between the 
creation of a ban in commercial trade and provisions for some 
commercial trade in spite of the ban can co-exist so that the purpose 
behind the ban is not undermined.  Logically, the justifications can 
make sense; for example, some populations of a species do not need 
the same level of protection, or trade in species can enhance support 
for their conservation.  Yet, the uncertainty surrounding markets for 
the most endangered species can challenge this logic.  Given that we 
are dealing here with the most endangered species, we should 
scrutinize the arguments carefully. 
Incomplete bans are ultimately a compromise position.  In this, 
they differ significantly from dual stream markets, because the 
                                                                                                               
 50 CITES, supra note 6, art. VII(4). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
78 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 12 
 
signals they send to the market are different.  Instead of allowing 
trade up to a certain point or within certain parameters, incomplete 
bans recognize the role of a ban on trade, yet send mixed signals about 
the future status of that ban.  How, then, do these mixed signals affect 
the arguments that support legal trade?51 
IV. UNCERTAIN MARKETS FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES 
Some of the most logically compelling arguments for 
allowing some trade in certain species and their parts rely on supply-
side economic theories.52  Supply-side economists point out that the 
cost of items traded on the black market are extremely high and that, 
despite the fact that international trade in those items is illegal, 
demand appears insatiable.  With rhino horn estimated to be among 
the highest-valued commodities—higher than gold, diamonds, and 
cocaine,53 an institution like the Natural History Museum in London 
does not display a real horn on its stuffed rhinoceros exhibit for fear 
of theft.  If the market in these products is legalized, the argument 
goes, supply can be increased and the price will go down.  Once the 
price goes down, the incentives for poachers will be removed and 
poachers and those involved in the illegal trade will move out of the 
market.54  These arguments seem so logically compelling that they 
can be easily and quickly presented in opinion pieces in the print 
                                                                                                               
 51 For additional discussion of the assumptions behind arguments for legal trade in 
endangered species, see Annecoos Wiersema, Uncertainty and Markets for Endangered 
Species Under CITES, 22 RECIEL 239, 241–49 (2013) (assessing the economic arguments 
of proponents such as demand elasticity for legalizing trade in endangered species under 
CITES).  For additional discussion of uncertainty in wildlife trade, see Wiersema, supra note 
12, at 378–88 (explaining how information gaps along with complexity and indeterminacy 
cause uncertainty in deciding whether to legalize trade for species). 
 52 See, e.g., Duan Biggs et al., Legal Trade of Africa’s Rhino Horns, 339 SCI. 1038 
(2013) (arguing that while legal trade would help conservation efforts, a trade ban limits 
supply and thus increases prices and poaching,); Kirsten Conrad, Trade Bans: A Perfect 
Storm for Poaching? 5 TROPICAL CONSERVATION SCI. 245 (2012) (claiming that trade ban 
has not resolved the problem of decline of wild populations for some species). 
 53 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 54 See, e.g., Michael ‘t Sas-Rolfes, Who Will Save the Wild Tiger?, PERC POLICY 
SERIES (Feb. 1998), at 1, 10 (“While legal trade could make it easier for illegal traders to 
operate, a legal supply could bring down the average market price of tiger products.”); Biggs 
et al., supra note 52 (“A legal trade could simultaneously supply horns, fund rhino protection, 
and provide an incentive for their sustainable use and long-term survival.”); Conrad, supra 
note 52 (stating that legal trade is a viable tactic for conservation). 
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media, such as an opinion piece by The Guardian’s well-regarded 
Simon Jenkins.55 
These supply-side arguments are based on a number of 
assumptions.  For species subject to incomplete bans, species that are 
at the greatest risk from an unsustainable demand, these assumptions 
are often questionable, and the predictions based on them are at best 
uncertain. 
A. Market Behavior and Speculation 
Bulte and Damania have argued that the supply-side model 
relied on by many proponents of legalizing trade assumes perfectly 
competitive markets.56  However, as Bulte and Damania point out, 
markets for endangered species are more appropriately considered to 
be run as oligopolies.57  In these markets, it is not clear that creating 
a legal supply will result in traders leaving the market. Instead, they 
may increase their activity to try to compensate for the lower per-unit 
profit made for each specimen due to the newly flooded market.58 
This in turn leads to a highly significant problem for 
incomplete bans: the possibility of speculation.  If traders are aware 
that a ban may be temporary and that any ban on commercial trade 
may be subject to exceptions, there is an incentive to stockpile either 
legally or illegally.59  There may even be an incentive to speed up the 
process of extinction in order to ensure a higher price for stockpiled 
                                                                                                               
 55 Simon Jenkins, Opinion, If You Really Want to Save the Elephants, Farm Them, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/13/save-
elephants-farm-them-ivory-tusks, archived at https://perma.cc/44MC-FJY7. 
 56 Erwin H. Bulte & Richard Damania, An Economic Assessment of Wildlife Farming 
and Conservation, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1222, 1224 (2005). 
 57 Id. at 1227.  See also R. Craig Kirkpatrick & Lucy Emerton, Killing Tigers to Save 
Them: Fallacies of the Farming Argument, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 655, 657, 658 (2010) 
(“Oligopolistic, illicit organizations control illegal tiger markets through complex smuggling 
networks.”); MILLIKEN & SHAW, supra note 40, at 81–82 (summarizing the events that drive 
an escalating illicit trade in rhino horns from South Africa to Vietnam). 
 58 Bulte & Damania, supra note 56, at 1227.  Alternatively, traders may move to other 
species, creating spillover effects.  However, this is less a problem for the species subject to 
an incomplete ban, so I do not dwell on it here. 
 59 See Charles F. Mason, Erwin H. Bulte, & Richard D. Horan, Banking on Extinction: 
Endangered Species and Speculation, 28 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 180 (2012) (arguing 
that stockpiling in the hopes of extinction is profitable if current speculators are allowed to 
collude). 
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goods. 60   Arguments that current bans have not worked are 
undermined by the fact that we do not have complete bans.  We 
haven’t tried them because so many of our most endangered and 
iconic species are subject to incomplete bans now or the possibility 
that the ban will be incomplete in the future. 
B. Substitutability 
A second significant assumption is that the legal product will 
substitute perfectly for the illegal product or will be in higher demand.  
Yet, this is highly context- and species-specific.  There is evidence 
that some buyers prefer wild-caught over captive-bred species or their 
parts, so if legal supply is to come from ranched or captive-bred 
species, the legal product may not be substitutable.61 
The example from trophy hunting is illustrative here.  Cecil 
the Lion was shot in unusual circumstances with aspects that raised 
legal questions, despite the fact that there are many avenues through 
which one can legally shoot an African lion in Zimbabwe or several 
other African countries.  Evidence from trophy hunting practices 
more generally suggests that despite the availability of legal trophy 
hunting, the community does not always abide by limits.  This goes 
to substitutability because it suggests that once a source is legal, it 
may no longer hold the same appeal.  Indeed, outside of trophy 
hunting, buyers may prefer wild specimens because the reason for 
demand is itself reliant on the power and iconic status of the wild 
animal, as with animal parts used for their supposed aphrodisiac 
properties.  Thus, legalizing a market will not always satisfy those 
who were willing to engage in the illegal market. 
The dynamic between trophy hunting of wild African lions 
and captive-bred lions adds another layer to the question of 
substitutability.  Because of the ethical concerns raised by captive-
bred lion hunts and canned hunts, some trophy hunting operations 
have distanced themselves from captive-bred lion hunts in order to 
demonstrate that they are not the same.62 
                                                                                                               
 60 Id.; Brian Gratwicke et al., The World Can’t Have Wild Tigers and Eat Them, Too, 
22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 222, 223 (2008). 
 61 Gratwicke et al., supra note 60, at 222. 
 62 P. Lindsey, R. Alexander, G. Balme, N. Midlane, & J. Craig, Possible Relationships 
Between the South African Captive-Bred Lion Hunting Industry and the Hunting and 
Conservation of Lions Elsewhere in Africa, 42 S. AFR. J. WILDLIFE RES. 11, 20 (2012). 
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Conversely, legalizing trade may fuel illegal poaching if the 
wild-caught specimens will be cheaper to obtain and therefore can be 
sold at a reduced price.  Evidence on trade in tiger skins suggests that 
captive-bred tiger skins can sell for 1.5–3 times higher than the price 
of wild tiger skins. 63   This question of substitutability is then 
connected to uncertainty about the costs of producing or maintaining 
a legal supply.  When advocates of legal trade suggest the sale of 
stockpiles, the source may indeed be cheaper than a wild supply.  
However, if species are to be captively bred, the cost of maintaining 
a legal supply may be higher and poached parts may undercut the 
legal market.64 
Uncertainty abounds here, and each species will be different.  
Abbot and van Kooten have observed that captive-breeding 
operations of tigers might produce cheaper products due to 
economies of scale.65  However, if this hypothesis is wrong and the 
output of tiger farms does not affect the price of wild-caught tigers, 
they posit that tiger farming will have no effect on poaching of wild 
tigers.66  The actual outcome cannot be predicted with certainty.67 
C. Laundering 
Concerns about substitutability are significant.  Yet, these 
concerns arise where it is possible to distinguish between the legal 
and the illegal products.  Incomplete bans also create another problem, 
which is almost the flip side of the substitutability problem, when it 
is difficult or impossible to distinguish between a legally-sourced 
product and an illegally-sourced product.  In many cases, once a part 
has been removed from an animal or the animal removed from its 
natural surroundings, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish the 
                                                                                                               
 63 ENVT’L INVESTIGATION AGENCY, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: CHINA’S CLANDESTINE 
TIGER TRADE 7 (2013), https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Hidden-in-
Plain-Sight-med-res.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/72G9-FS5T. 
 64 Miranda H. Mockrin, Elizabeth L. Bennett & Danielle T. LaBruna, Wildlife Farming: 
A Viable Alternative to Hunting in Tropical Forests? 15 (Wildlife Conservation Soc’y, 
Working Paper No. 23, 2005). 
 65 Brant Abbott & G. Cornelis van Kooten, Can Domestication of Wildlife Lead to 
Conservation? The Economics of Tiger Farming in China 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 721, 722 
(2011). 
 66 Id. at 723. 
 67 See id. at 722 (discussing the uncertainty about how poachers and farmers will 
behave in response to a legal, farmed supply of wildlife products). 
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species it has come from, as with pangolin scales.68  If the species is 
the same, but one source—a stockpile—is legal, and another—a 
poached animal—is illegal, it can be difficult for customs officials to 
distinguish the two groups.  Tremendous strides have been made with 
regard to ivory DNA, so that experts can identify legal and illegal 
ivory.69  However, these new techniques cannot be applied across the 
board. 
When it is hard or impossible to verify the source of a 
specimen, laundering becomes a significant problem.  Here, the 
problem is almost the opposite of substitutability; it is that illegal 
products can be moved through the legal market without trace.  
Indeed, traders may still be operating in the perfect market posited by 
supply-side economists, but they may be addressing the problem 
either by being willing to take a reduction in overall profit, or by 
increasing their units so that even if the per-unit price has gone down, 
their overall profit can be sustained. 
This in turn leads to important questions about regulatory 
needs and the costs of dual stream markets.  To address the possibility 
of laundering, a strong enforcement infrastructure is required.  Dual 
stream markets also require regulatory efforts to ensure that 
consumers can distinguish between legal and illegal products. 
Laundering problems are exacerbated further by incomplete 
bans.  In a regular dual stream market, there are likely to be many 
legal market actors, all of whom have an incentive to help police the 
legal market in order to ensure its continued viability and 
sustainability.  The cost of entry to the legal side of a dual stream 
market may not be negligible—sometimes it is related to family ties 
or community membership—but it is likely to be lower than the cost 
of entry to the legal component of an incomplete ban.  For example, 
many sales of stockpiles will involve sale between state entities, and 
not include private actors.  The exceptions to the ban in an incomplete 
ban are limited enough that the cost of entry to legality is likely to be 
high.  Yet, because an incomplete ban implicitly acknowledges and 
then in turn feeds demand for the species and its parts, an illegal 
trader—unable to enter the legal market—has an incentive to 
                                                                                                               
 68 Prop. 12, supra note 39. 
 69 Claudia Dreifus, Samuel K. Wasser, A Scientific Detective Trailing Poachers, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/science/samuel-wasser-dna-
elephants-ivory.html, archived at https://perma.cc/N2U9-YBWA. 
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continue to provide an illegal supply.  If legal and illegal specimens 
are hard or impossible to distinguish, laundering becomes easier. 
D. Demand 
Incentives to launder exist only if there is a market and 
demand for a species or its parts.  Proponents of some legal trade have 
argued that demand shows no sign of declining.70  Further, some 
commentators opposed to bans on trade of certain animal parts have 
argued that attempts to reduce demand are culturally insensitive 
because the uses have a long history of cultural significance. 71  
Neither of these is always true.  Campaigns to reduce demand for 
ivory and shark fins in China have shown some success and demand 
for rhino horn in Yemen has dropped dramatically.72  Uses for animal 
parts are also not always tied to long histories of culturally significant 
use.  The highest demand for rhino horn in Viet Nam appears to be 
related to a new (unverified) claim that it can cure cancer and as 
evidence of new wealth in the form of conspicuous consumption.73 
The creation of legal markets can limit the effectiveness of 
efforts to reduce demand because it sends mixed signals.  Indeed, 
because the availability of legal products can destigmatize 
consumption, demand will often increase. 74   Incomplete bans are 
particularly problematic because the effectiveness of the ban can be 
easily undermined by continued or increased demand.  Periodic sales 
can undermine gradually diminishing demand, and because of the 
                                                                                                               
 70 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 52, at 250 (hypothesizing that demand reduction is 
probably a “multi-generational process”). 
 71 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 52, at 250 (observing that some cultures view trade of 
some animal parts as part of their tradition or identity). 
 72 Lucy Vigne & Esmond Martin, Demand for Rhino Horn Declines in Yemen, 47 ORYX 
323 (2013); WildAid’s Campaign Helps Reduce Shark Fin Demand, WILDAID (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.wildaid.org/news/wildaids-campaign-helps-reduce-shark-fin-demand, archived 
at https://perma.cc/MHE6-A4WJ.  See also SABRI ZAIN, TRAFFIC, BEHAVIOUR CHANGE WE 
CAN BELIEVE IN: TOWARDS A GLOBAL DEMAND REDUCTION STRATEGY FOR TIGERS 2 (2012), 
http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_mammals71.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/P8DV-LVPB (discussing the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 have seen large-scale 
ivory seizures). 
 73 MILLIKEN & SHAW, supra note 40, at 134–36. 
 74 See Carolyn Fischer, The Complex Interaction of Markets for Endangered Species 
Products, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 926, 947 (2004) (alteration in original) (“A trade 
ban is more likely to be needed when stigma effects . . . are weak and lawful demand is 
strong.”). 
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fear that the ban will be put in place again, may increase demand 
during the windows of time when a legal supply is available. 
E. Conservation and Local Communities 
Trophy hunting and other legal markets are often seen as a 
critical tool to generate both support and revenue for conservation.75  
The possibility of revenue from endangered species is important 
because poachers frequently poach due to a lack of other economic 
opportunities.76  Local communities often do not benefit from the 
conservation of the species. 
However, it is unclear that incomplete bans will assist with 
either conservation or the welfare of local communities.  Dual stream 
markets that create opportunities for local communities to enter the 
market can add significant support for conservation, as seems to have 
been the case with the vicuña.77  However, as discussed above, the 
legal markets created where there are incomplete bans are tightly 
controlled and may not be recurring.  Even if the ability to profit is 
opened to more people than the state, as with trophy hunting or 
captive-breeding, the opportunities to profit will often go to private 
actors who are not necessarily contributing their own profits to local 
communities or to conservation efforts.  Captive-breeding programs 
can operate very far from the native habitat of the wild species, 
thereby limiting any gain for the local community in having legal 
trade. 
Although commentators disagree on the relative merits and 
risks of trophy hunting for conservation, they generally acknowledge 
the importance of governance and regulatory structure. 78  
                                                                                                               
 75 Peter A. Lindsey et al., Trophy Hunting and Conservation in Africa: Problems and 
One Potential Solution, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 880, 880–881 (2007).  See also Onishi, 
supra note 4 (endorsing the necessity of hunting in Africa). 
 76 Cf. Rosaleen Duffy, Freya A.V. St John, Bram Büscher & Dan Brockington, Toward 
a New Understanding of the Links Between Poverty and Illegal Wildlife Hunting, 30 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 14 (2016) (questioning the idea that local communities engage in 
illegal wildlife hunting solely due to poverty); Dellinger, supra note 1, at 412–416 
(discussing evidence that questions the value of trophy hunting to local communities). 
 77 McAllister et al., supra note 42. 
 78 See, e.g., William-Georges Crosmary et al., The Assessment of the Role of Trophy 
Hunting in Wildlife Conservation, 18 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 136, 136–37 (2015) (noting 
that poor management will damage the sustainability of trophy hunting); Richard B. Harris 
et al., Application of the Anthropogenic Allee Effect Model to Trophy Hunting as a 
Conservation Tool, 27 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 945, 949–50 (2013) (arguing that 
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Commentators also generally agree that more study is needed and 
more monitoring should be put in place, both of which require 
capacity and resources.79  Yet lack of resources can make it hard for 
restrictions to be policed and benefits to be adequately shared.  In 
addition, corruption and mismanagement can lead to significant 
problems.80 
In addition, the risks from some legal activities for those 
species that are subject to incomplete bans are higher because those 
species are endangered and populations are at greater risk from 
careless killing.  Populations of species can go down if hunting 
operations are not carefully managed.81  Further, even if the numbers 
targeted fall within conservation goals, trophy hunting does not target 
animals based on the targets conservation biologists might choose.  
Again, the story of Cecil the Lion demonstrates this.  Although the 
lion pride Cecil headed appears to have recovered,82 it is unlikely that 
any conservationist interested in the survival of wild populations of 
                                                                                                               
conservation managers should focus on the critical conservation characteristics such as 
corruption and property rights); S.A.J. Selier & E. Di Minin, Commentary, Monitoring 
Required for Effective Sustainable Use of Wildlife, 18 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 131, 131–32 
(2015) (noting the importance of effective monitoring for wildlife sustainability); 
Lindsey et al., supra note 75, at 882 (concluding that the mismanagement of governments 
and operators is a significant threat to conservation). 
 79 See, e.g., R. Buckley & A. Mossaz, Hunting Tourism and Animal Conservation, 18 
ANIMAL CONSERVATION 133, 133–34 (2015) (acknowledging that a single case study is 
insufficient); Harris et al., supra note 78 ( “Those interested in the interaction between trophy 
hunting and conservation should question models that fail to capture important elements on 
the systems in question.”); Selier & Di Minin, supra note 78 (“However, in order to 
understand the consequences of management activities such as trophy hunting and to 
implement an adaptive quota system, based on population trends, long-term monitoring is 
essential.”). 
 80 CRAIG PACKER, LIONS IN THE BALANCE: MAN-EATERS, MANES, AND MEN WITH GUNS 
(2015); Elizabeth L. Bennett, Legal Ivory Trade in a Corrupt World and Its Impact on 
African Elephant Populations, 29 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 54, 56–58 (2014).  See also 
DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, MISSING THE 
MARK: AFRICAN TROPHY HUNTING FAILS TO SHOW CONSISTENT BENEFITS (June 13, 2016), 
http://democrats-naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Missing%20the%20Mark.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/GAG4-DVAB (concluding that conservation efforts have been 
marred by corruption in certain regions); Jada F. Smith, Trophy Hunting Fees Do Little to 
Help Threatened Species, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/trophy-hunting-fees-do-little-to-help-threatened-
species-report-says.html, archived at https://perma.cc/JU3C-EV3B (explaining the 
significance of the Democratic Staff’s House report, “Missing the Mark,” in relation to the 
killing of Cecil in Zimbabwe). 
 81 C. Packer, H. Brink et al., Effects of Trophy Hunting on Lion and Leopard 
Populations in Tanzania, 25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 142, 151 (2010). 
 82 Actman, supra note 1. 
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the African lion would have advocated that Cecil be shot.  In species 
that are not at such risk of extinction, selection through hunting may 
change the species, but the effects may take longer or may be less 
significant because the species itself is able to breed and replenish.  
In species that are endangered, hunting without careful conservation 
parameters can significantly change and potentially harm the 
species.83 
A similar concern can arise for captive-breeding and ranching 
programs, particularly if those programs are designed for commercial 
gain.  Breeding species domestically can change those species, 
sometimes intentionally, so that certain traits are highlighted and 
augmented—picture a scenario where rhino ranching is successful 
and the goal becomes to breed rhinos that grow horns quickly and 
perhaps even rhinos that are not difficult when it comes time to 
dehorn them.  This could result in a very different rhino population 
from the one we have now.  While this could be preferable to 
extinction of the species completely, it is an important consideration 
when wild populations are low. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE DIFFICULTY OF INCOMPLETE 
BANS 
As we have seen, incomplete bans can exacerbate the 
uncertainty already inherent in regulating dual stream markets.  This 
is in part because they involve already severely endangered species 
for whom there is unsustainable demand.  Incomplete bans cannot 
open the market up completely, because that would be too risky in 
such an unsustainable market.  Yet, on the other side, they do not 
allow for the effects of a complete ban, including the possibility of a 
dramatic reduction in demand, to work.  As such, they are a risky 
proposition. 
One possible response would be to pursue incomplete bans 
because of the promise they offer, while being aware that they will 
require stronger regulatory efforts than normal dual stream markets.  
However, this requires adequate funding of these stronger regulatory 
efforts to counter the continued demand, laundering, and corruption, 
while still ensuring good conservation.  This will be easier in some 
                                                                                                               
 83 See Dellinger, supra note 1, at 408–09 (discussing potential ecological and species-
survival problems arising from killing by hunting). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss1/5
2016] INCOMPLETE BANS AND UNCERTAIN MARKETS 87 
 
places than others, and even then will require intensive focus. 84  
While the story of Cecil the Lion may demonstrate only that one man 
can kill one iconic lion, it serves as an important reminder than the 
existence of legal sources for our most endangered and sought-after 
species creates pathways for unmonitored killing that does not 
contribute to overall conservation of the species. 
The arguments raised here have been raised at a high level of 
generality.  Every conservation decision should be made carefully, 
with regard to the species, and in context.  Where a species has met 
the threshold requiring a level of protection under CITES that 
amounts to a ban on trade, under either Appendix I or Appendix II, 
more predictability is needed before exceptions are imposed to that 
ban.  For the most endangered species, we should be wary of 
incomplete bans that exacerbate already unpredictable and uncertain 
market dynamics. 
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